career · investing · journalism

If the Man Wants a Purple Suit …

I’m in the process of clearing out my basement and, as dusty old boxes sometimes do, the contents of one took me on a trip down Memory Lane. They also made me think about a lesson I learned that investors would do well to understand today.

The artifacts were the lucite “deal toys” from various initial public offerings and secondaries I worked on as an equity analyst. These usually adorn the desk and then, as they get more senior, the office of any self-respecting investment banker. Lots of trophies made you a “big swinging dick.” Fighting my hoarder tendencies and my ego, I dumped them in the trash.

But there were three rectangular hunks of clear plastic in that box that I kept: my Institutional Investor awards. Back then at least, the best thing you could do for your career as an analyst was to be “II ranked” in that magazine’s annual survey of fund managers–coming in among the top three in a category. And if you were number one then the magazine would write a flattering blurb with anonymous quotes and a caricature artist would make a drawing of you as an athlete–football in the U.S. and soccer in Europe. Your face also was on the cover of the magazine. It figured heavily into your career prospects and bonus. Andy Kessler wrote a nice piece about it back in 2001 when I was still in the business.

As soon as I heard about this, I made it my goal to be on that magazine cover, and for three years in a row I was. Is that because I was so good at picking emerging market stocks? I suppose I was okay, but it really was a measure of how much clients liked and valued you. For most of them that meant how often you called, how ready you were to organize trips and entertainment for them, and how smart you made them feel. I remember hearing one of our large clients repeat almost verbatim to a bunch of his clients, a group of pension consultants–a rare peek for me at how that particular sausage was made–part of the presentation I had recently given him. He got a detail or two mixed up, but I don’t think they noticed.

But before my Institutional Investor glory and all those 90 hour weeks and client ass-kissing, pretty much exactly 30 years ago, I was wet behind the ears and, to quote Liar’s Poker, still “lower than whale shit on the bottom of the ocean floor” at dear-departed CS First Boston. Our then-largest client asked me about two Eastern European companies and I told him that I was pretty sure one was run by a crook and that the other one, despite being backed by some well-respected financiers, was headed for bankruptcy. Much to my surprise, the client wasn’t happy that I had shared this opinion with him and bought more of them instead of the stock that I recommended.

A salesman covering the account who had way more Wall Street experience than almost anyone on my team took me out to lunch in Budapest that summer of 1994 and clearly was exasperated at what a dummy I was. “Spencer, if the man wants a purple suit, sell him a purple suit.” In other words, we’re in the selling business. If someone wants to do something dumb then he’s a big boy so just make sure we’re the ones who get the fat commission.

I remember feeling like a little kid learning that there‘s no Santa Claus*, but he was absolutely right. One company went bankrupt and the CEO looted the other one. A competing analyst got quite a bit of attention for a brilliant exposé about him and his offshore dealings and I remember feeling envious–probably an indication of why I later went into financial journalism. But I made way more money than her in the business and got to be on those magazine covers, so there’s that.

Even after all these years, Wall Street isn’t so much in the advice as in the customer satisfaction business. Last week I saw one of my former Wall Street Journal colleagues, Eric Wallerstein, on CNBC. He was a brilliant financial scribe and I’m sure he’ll do really well in his new role as chief strategist at Yardeni Research. But in an interview on “Closing Bell,” Scott Wapner immediately gave him a hard time because the firm he had just joined hadn’t raised its S&P 500 target for the end of the year. The figure had already been reached after a torrid first half. Everyone else was doing it, and Eric said he still liked the market, so why not raise it?

The interaction tells you how un-serious financial media can be. First of all, if I remember correctly, Eric’s boss, Wall Street veteran Ed Yardeni, had set a 5,400 point target in 2023 when the S&P 500 was around 4,000, so he made a good call. But I’m pretty sure he doesn’t possess a crystal ball to tell you where an index, much less an individual stock, will be trading in six months. 

There’s nothing like a rapidly rising market to make people even more confident in stocks, though, so CNBC’s viewers were looking for a number to underpin their optimism. I hate to sound so dismissive of my former profession: Analysts and strategists work hard and do a lot of useful things, but spending thousands of hours writing hundreds of pages to tell people what they want to hear with a false degree of precision isn’t one of them. 

A prime example of the horse following the cart comes from the market’s now-favorite stock, Nvidia. If an analyst had been really, really smart then he or she might have guessed that AI chips would be worth their weight in gold and that Nvidia would get a lot more valuable. 

But last April, with the stock at $27.75, analysts’ price targets all clustered at or slightly above that level with the average target being 2.3% higher. There were no three-digit price targets (the stock has since split so I mean on the current number of shares). Any analyst who had stuck his or her neck out and said that would be a legend but probably would have been doing it to gain notoriety like Henry Blodget and his infamous “Amazon $400” call in 1998. Merrill Lynch soon fired its analyst covering Amazon and hired Blodget from second-tier broker CIBC Oppenheimer for a princely sum.** It isn’t worth the career risk of making a prediction like that for someone already working at a top firm. And if you are going to stick your neck out at a big bank, try to be an optimist. This week JPMorgan Chase dumped its strategist, Marko Kolanovic, described as “the biggest bear” on Wall Street for, among other things, missing the AI boom.

Back to Nvidia: Fast forward to last July and the price and the average target had jumped dramatically to $46.75 and $50.09. By this January those numbers were $61.53 and $67.45. In April it was $86.40 and $99.70, respectively, with analysts racing to keep up. At the end of June 2024 it was $125.83 and $129.01 with not a single “sell” recommendation out of 62 analysts polled by FactSet (55 “buy” or “overweight” and 7 “hold”).

Yes, good things have happened. No, it isn’t the case that any serious discounted cash flow model making good faith projections instead of looking at the stock price spit out exactly $28 last April and $128 today. That doesn’t mean the latter number can’t be right, or even too conservative, but it does tell you that analysts are watching the price rise and telling their customers what they want to hear. 

As another recently-departed WSJ colleague, Charley Grant, wrote as his swan song this past week, “No Nvidia in Your Portfolio? You’re Just Toast.” For both analysts and fund managers–the ones who pay them and vote in those surveys–not being on board has been career suicide. At the time of Charley’s article, Nvidia stock was up a whopping 149% year-to-date compared with 4.1% for the average S&P 500 stock so just missing that one name, or even worse some of the others lifted by AI mania, would devastate a fund manager’s relative returns. And forget about getting your caricature on that magazine cover if you insist Nvidia is really worth $50 a share and stick to your guns.

If you’re reading this and you aren’t paid a salary by Wall Street then take note: Your career isn’t at risk if you don’t own the latest hot thing. You might have one less thing to brag about to your friends, but don’t let groupthink or FOMO make you do something that leaves your spidey-senses tingling–you’ll be better off in the long run. The next time a well-paid investing professional makes a persuasive case for something that doesn’t feel or sound right to you, just picture this guy in your mind.

*I felt almost the same way a month into my current career as a journalist when I was told that it really didn’t matter if I wrote well since that isn’t what I get paid for.

**He was later banned from the securities industry for life.

investing

Could the Next Berkshire Hathaway Be a Meme Stock?

An investor being called “the next Warren Buffett” is a lot like an athlete gracing a magazine cover or a company slapping its name on a stadium. And it isn’t just a prelude to a stumble–compiling a track record as good and long the Oracle of Omaha’s is basically impossible.

But what about turning a company into “the new Berkshire Hathaway?” There are and have been a handful of stocks that have served investors very well as pools of patient capital such as insurer Markel, cable baron John Malone’s various entities and some now-defunct conglomerates with roots in the 1960s.

Before last week, money-losing videogame retailer GameStop seemed like a pretty unlikely addition to that short list. Its meme-inspired shareholders have the attention spans of fleas and the company’s C-suite resembles a revolving door as it heads for its sixth consecutive year of losses. 

Yet the board’s recent decision to allow Chief Executive and Chairman Ryan Cohen to invest the company’s cash in stocks–a step one analyst called “inane”–has invited Berkshire comparisons that aren’t completely off-base. The textile company that became Buffett’s investment vehicle was itself a lousy business. Buffett eventually threw in the towel on those operations, using the company’s excess cash to earn early investors 40,000 times their money.

Cohen certainly has a, um, different approach than Buffett, but he has shown a knack for buying low and selling high. He mainly bought his GameStop stake before “Roaring Kitty” helped send its shares to the moon, accumulating most of his 36.8 million shares in mid-2020 for about $30 million. Less than a year later, with the stock still elevated from a historic squeeze, the company sold a split-adjusted 20 million shares, raising $1.67 billion in an at-the-market offering to its enthusiastic retail investors. The stake owned by his holding company, RC Ventures, is still worth close to $400 million.

More recently, RC Ventures invested $120 million in Bed Bath & Beyond and pushed for changes and board representation. Individual investors dove in, despite the company’s well-documented risk of insolvency. Cohen then sold his entire stake months later for a quick profit of nearly $60 million prior to its bankruptcy filing.

Stocks tend to rise when news breaks of Berkshire taking a stake, but those gains pale in comparison to when a meme stock CEO makes an investment. For example, in 2022 nearly-defunct gold miner Hycroft mining surged by more than 600% after movie chain AMC Entertainment Holdings took a stake. So why not ride the coattails of an investor with social media street cred and an apparent Midas touch? 

An obvious reason is that convincing people to buy overvalued stocks isn’t an infinitely repeatable exercise. Buying undervalued ones can be, but it often takes years to be proven right. Attracting sufficiently patient shareholders has been challenging even for Buffett, who has been prematurely accused more than once of “losing his touch.” Is the YOLO trader crowd going to stick around after a few bad years?

If not, he needs different shareholders. But they’ll have to trust him. Cohen, who faces a Securities and Exchange Commission probe into his Bed Bath & Beyond trading, hasn’t been accused of wrongdoing. The fact remains, though, that in order to earn his big scores in publicly-traded stocks, thousands with less money and sophistication had to lose. That could make it hard both to raise more cash in public markets or to pursue the sort of handshake deals Buffett has made over the years.

Even after losing more than four-fifths of its value since its Jan. 2021 heyday, not a single analyst polled by FactSet recommends buying GameStop’s shares. Of course the lesson of the meme stock explosion was that the approval of serious people in boardrooms isn’t always necessary or even desirable to make money in the stock market. And don’t forget the people who earned some of those people’s ultimate compliment–comparisons with Warren Buffett–when riding high: Michael Pearson of Valeant Pharmaceuticals, Eddie Lampert of Sears Holdings and Sam Bankman-Fried of FTX.

So clearly Wall Street isn’t always the best judge of character. Even so, Cohen will have to put up some impressive gains to even enter that conversation and they’ll have to accrue to his public shareholders, not him personally.

investing · journalism · Uncategorized

A Financial Crisis in Plain Sight?

Who could have seen it coming?

Financial markets are full of surprises. Here’s how to possibly avoid some of the costlier ones. After they are sitting on losses or regretting a missed opportunity, some investors will literally blame the messenger. Why didn’t my favorite financial publication warn me about this, or why were they so pessimistic about what turned out to be a great opportunity?

There are reasons for this. One should be obvious: Unlike parts of the paper like my column at The Wall Street Journal, Heard on the Street, reporters report. They rely on the assessments and opinions of participants in the financial markets. If most people expect, say, a recession, as a majority of Wall Street economists did this time last year, that is likely going to be the conversation they have with any two or three talking heads. It is also likely to be reflected in prices. And, as we know, they were dead wrong–the U.S. economy actually grew at an annual rate of above 5% last quarter.

Another reason is that the people who sit on the masthead of a publication are overly obsessed with big, round numbers. They are one way that financial journalists, and hence the savers and speculators who follow them, miss the forest for the trees.

Financial journalists and editors are told to drop what they’re doing because some big, round financial number is about to be breached. The number is lighting up search engines so we need to be all over it–clicks are what pay the bills these days. Just like a watched pot never seems to boil, though, those milestones taunt us. Sometimes we even wind up ignoring the big picture as a result–a mistake we’re making right now.

I recall conversations in February 2020 at The Wall Street Journal about what seemed like the imminent crossing of Dow 30,000. The day that the index got the closest to that milestone China reported that the number of cases of a deadly virus recently named Covid-19 were actually 10 times as high as previously thought. In the sixth paragraph of the “pan”–our daily, rolling markets story–a Goldman Sachs report saying that a drop-off in exports to China could lop half a percentage point off of U.S. economic growth that quarter gets a mention.

As we know, investors who took comfort in that mild assessment, if they ever even got that deep into the article, were about to be blindsided by what should have been an obvious risk to their portfolios and the world economy. The index would within weeks be flirting with 18,000 points.

The recent breach of 5% on the benchmark U.S. Treasury note was a bit different. Just like a watched pot never boils, it took quite a while to happen. And when it did (only during non-U.S. trading for those of you checking), the tsunami of coverage went from causing angst to inspiring a wave of buying buy people who haven’t seen yields like this since the Bush administration. Here’s Barron’s Magazine:

Whether or not you locked in 5% or are cursing yourself for sitting on the sidelines doesn’t matter all that much. What does is that the cost of money went from nothing to quite a bit in a hurry after many years of artificially low interest rates. During that time,  government borrowing around the world ballooned–especially in the United States. Federal debt held by the public has gone from $5 trillion in 2007 to more than $25 trillion today. 

The interest on that debt is climbing fast as old bonds roll over and new ones are issued. It was more than $800 billion in the past 12 months and is well on its way to passing $1 trillion a year. For perspective, net interest is now nearly the size of all non-defense discretionary spending. And I’m afraid that defense isn’t about to become less of a priority. As alarming as that sounds, the average rate on that debt was only 2% a year ago and just recently crossed 3%. Despite all the attention it received in newsrooms, the 10 year note was actually the last maturity to breach 5%.

If bond yields stay even at today’s slightly more modest level for any appreciable length of time then already ominous projected trillion dollar annual deficits will be much higher. That will affect not just our pocketbooks but America’s ability to wage war, deal with banking crises, and much more. The panglossian 10-year budget projections by the Congressional Budget Office have interest rates somehow staying at 3% this year and no recessions ever. Anyone paying attention should see that rates being this high could have a double-effect on the budget deficit by also pushing growth lower, hurting tax revenue.

Like Covid pretty becoming uncontainable by early 2020, it might in theory be possible to alter that trajectory with some extreme efforts like massive tax hikes, but the political will and recognition of the threat need to be far greater. If this were just a warning about interest costs being high for a while or taxes needing to rise then you could call my cute headline alarmist. The problem, though, is that the numbers will within just a couple of years be too big to reverse. 

How so? Either rising bond yields will become self-fulfilling as the people who buy bonds with the hope of an expected positive return worry about America losing control of its budget with programs like Social Security and Medicare set to deplete their funding early next decade. Like an emerging market, a vicious cycle of rising rates can accelerate the reckoning. By my estimate, simply adding a single percentage point to the average interest rate would result in $3.5 trillion in additional borrowing by 2033.

More likely, though, the effect of all this on the economy will soon push the Fed to resume expansion of its balance sheet or to at least start cutting no matter how high inflation is. With fixed income, it is your real return that matters, and that could turn negative. Of the few tricks left in the Fed and Treasury’s arsenal to control the problem, allowing that to happen is the most likely. 

This is what risk expert Michele Wucker calls a “Gray Rhino” – “a highly probable, high impact yet neglected threat” – a mix of a black swan and elephant in the room. Yet record sums have flowed into exchange traded funds that own long-term U.S. Treasury bonds.

That has been a good short-term trade, but it sounds like a potentially awful long-term bet. Buying anything on the assumption that a greater fool will provide liquidity when you’ve made your money is a silly risk. I’ll finish this essay with the standard “not investment advice” boilerplate, but I’ll also tell you what I’m doing with my own little pile of savings. None of it is in bonds with a maturity beyond three years except for those that compensate me for future inflation. I’ll gladly give up a capital gain in long term bonds to avoid what, through inflation or some other means, looks like it could be ugly.

investing · The book

The Psychology of the Meme Stock “Revolution”

A year ago, the concentrated financial power and frustration of millions of novice stock traders rocked Wall Street, alarmed Washington and turned journalists into armchair sociologists. The stranger-than-fiction story sent both publishers and Hollywood studios scrambling to tell it. I’m one of the lucky people who got paid to delve into GameStop mania in the form of a book and I was surprised by much of what I learned.

“The Revolution That Wasn’t” might sound like a “nothing to see here folks” type take, but that couldn’t be further from the truth. Sure the efforts of millions of mostly young speculators to stick it to the man and make a fortune in the process didn’t live up to the breathless headlines of late January 2021. They actually delivered Wall Street and already rich corporate insiders a massive payday. Yet they also showed the awesome power that apps we carry on our smartphones can have over markets.

 I get asked frequently whether another stock will rise from obscurity to become a national obsession again. Probably not quite the way that GameStop did: The crowd’s energy has surged again and again into fruitless attempts to recreate last January’s magic that require “diamond hands” – holding onto crumbling meme stocks no matter what to effect the “mother of all short squeezes,” but professional investors are no longer asleep at the wheel. The more interesting question is why GameStop mania happened in the first place.  I often think of this quote to put things into context:

“We find that whole communities suddenly fix their minds upon one object, and go mad in its pursuit; that millions of people become simultaneously impressed with one delusion, and run after it, till their attention is caught by some new folly more captivating than the first.”

Charles Mackay wrote that passage decades before anybody could describe themselves as a psychologist. He was a journalist, like me, and his classic, “Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds,” was published in the midst of Britain’s 1840s Railway Mania. His description of that and other episodes like the South Sea and Mississippi bubbles and Tulip-mania in the preceding centuries are rich with insight into human nature. We have been through numerous manias since then as well – most recently dot-coms and housing. History doesn’t repeat, but it certainly rhymes.

As a long-time investing columnist for The Wall Street Journal and a student of financial history, I still was surprised at some of the new twists to this age-old pattern in the GameStop story. The human psyche hasn’t changed, but Wall Street and Silicon Valley’s understanding of it certainly has. Nobody working at stock brokerages like Robinhood or social media firms like Twitter, TikTok, or Reddit predicted that an informal army of amateurs would blow multi-billion dollar holes in major investment firms for fun and profit. They surely understood, though, that they were pushing psychological buttons that could enrich them at the public’s expense.

Take reinforcement. Since behaviorist B.F. Skinner’s experiments on the variable reward ratio in the 1950s, games of chance such as slot machines and their digital equivalents have been designed to provide stimuli that, for far too many people, lead to addiction. While the stock market isn’t really “a casino,” as some critics contend, the newest generation of smartphone based trading apps borrow heavily from the gambling world to create engagement. Robinhood, which has captured about half of all new brokerage accounts opened in the past five years, has been sued for using animated confetti and giving away free shares of widely ranging value–a lottery-like prize– for opening accounts and referring new customers.

Today it is nearly free and effortless to be an investor by buying and holding diversified index funds and it is becoming common knowledge that even the pros can’t beat those plain vanilla products 80 percent of the time. But index funds are far less profitable for the industry. Instead of having them “set it and forget it,” checking their portfolios occasionally, online brokers have convinced some customers to trade thousands of times a year. Robinhood’s active users check their accounts several times a day.

“You were born an investor,” claim its ads targeted at young people. Their costly level of hyperactivity is in part due to the “illusion of control” described by Ellen Langer’s experiments in which people put an irrational value on personal agency. That is why lottery sales are far higher when people can pick their own numbers despite identical odds. 

Meanwhile, the Dunning-Kruger Effect–the behavioral bias that makes novices overconfident in their abilities–was put on steroids by the pandemic. The wave of new account openings coincided with both the arrival of pandemic stimulus checks and the quickest rebound ever from a bear market in 2020. In a trend never seen before, 96 percent of stocks would rise in the ensuing year, making investing look easy. Dave “Day Trader” Portnoy, himself a newbie who boasted that he was better than 91 year-old legend Warren Buffett, would livestream himself picking tiles out of a Scrabble bag to choose stocks to his huge social media audience. Success, as they say, is the worst teacher.

And when they opened the app, Robinhood and its many imitators showed them the day’s most active stocks for a reason–to stoke the fear of missing out. Studies have tied acting on FOMO to feelings of regret. When the newest speculators buy too late or sell too early to make a score, they are encouraged to keep trying, as exploited by gambling establishments through the near miss effect (like when a slot machine displays two of three cherries or the ball in roulette falls one slot away from giving you that big payoff).

Of course so many people with so little money turning themselves into a major force in the market wouldn’t have been possible a generation ago. Trading stocks has become progressively cheaper. Robinhood was the first successful broker to charge nothing for a trade, though.

Trading isn’t really free–huge market makers gladly pay brokers to fill their customers’ orders–but the fact that small investors who have never paid a commission in their lives perceive it as costing nothing has triggered the “zero-price effect” described by behavioral finance experts. Demand normally rises when prices fall. The formula goes haywire, though, once prices hit nothing for something that also entertains us. Trading stocks for “free” has been made so much like a game that retail activity has exploded. 

This shift to zero at every major broker happened just in time for the pandemic, which supercharged locked-down and bored young people’s speculative tendencies. And because they got “house money” via stimulus checks, investors’ sometimes crippling fear of financial loss as described by Prospect Theory was short-circuited at a critical time. Millions opened accounts, many of whom had already dabbled in recently-legalized sports betting, and they found they liked stocks even more. The sharp market rebound from the initial pandemic plunge created unprecedented volatility and excitement. And brokerages’ irresponsibility in allowing newbies to trade complex stock options, with their asymmetric payoffs and finite time horizon, made investing resemble sports betting.

But what to buy? Young Americans’ love of social media meant that it was “finfluencers” like Portnoy rather than Mom and Dad’s broker at Morgan Stanley who provided ideas. The most influential voices were the most confident and often the wildest. And it was those stocks that did best for a while, reinforcing the wisdom of following the crowd. The top 100 stocks highlighted by Robinhood on its app rose by 102 percent in 2020 according to an index created by newsletter writer Noah Weidner–some six times as much as the benchmark S&P 500. Baskets of companies with no profits or those heavily shorted by skeptics also had a great year.

And, because Millennials and Gen Z share private information online so readily, those bragging about big scores on those stocks often backed it up with screenshots of their brokerage accounts. This triggered a phenomenon called social proof in which apparently successful people, even if they were just lucky, gained undue influence.

Virality was instrumental in the runaway popularity of small, money-losing companies. On Reddit’s r/wallstreetbets in particular, which would become the epicenter of the GameStop squeeze, reckless wagers in crowd favorites were the most likely to become “upvoted” and hence visible to somebody logging on. The wave of buying would become self-reinforcing and the support of certain stocks has become tribal and almost cult-like for some who dub themselves “apes” and who subscribe to conspiracy theories involving nefarious hedge funds and even journalists like me.

As of this writing, the thrill of overnight fortunes made and lost last year hasn’t faded for many trading novices. With the exception of those who are turning meme stocks into an obsession, though, the spell will break eventually. As Mackay sagely wrote 180 years ago: 

“Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, one by one.”

(This post originally appeared on LinkedIn)

Columns · investing · The book

Wall Street Journal book excerpt

(L-R) Bill Gross, Ken Griffin, Jason Mudrick, Vlad Tenev and Baiju Bhatt SIUNG TJIA/WSJ

Today’s Wall Street Journal has a 1,500 word excerpt of one of the chapters in my book. The article’s title is “Who Really Got Rich from the GameStop Revolution?” One helpful reader has already written to complain that they had to read too far into the article to find out. When I answer a WSJ subscriber (and I always do, unless they’re menacing or insulting), I try to be courteous. Still, the huge photo of five billionaires behind the article’s title was a pretty good hint, I think.

Anyway, the excerpt is an interesting part of the story but one of the less-surprising things you’ll learn if you read the book. Far more interesting to me was how trading and social media apps are so effective at getting people to act recklessly. The human psyche changes very slowly, but companies’ understanding of how to push our psychological buttons has evolved as quickly as the technology they can bring to bear. I’ve been working in or writing about financial markets for 29 years and I learned a lot while doing my research. You don’t have to be especially interested in finance for this to change the way you see things.

The book’s U.S. release is Tuesday, February 1st, available for pre-order now!

investing · The book

Podcast Mania!!!!

Not me

I’ve been invited on A LOT of podcasts recently-like losing my voice a lot. I’m profoundly grateful to all the hosts helping me to get the message out about the book on small investors and GameStop mania. The great thing is that they’re all different because the audiences and hosts differ. Here’s a wrap – so far.

New Books Network interviewer Daniel Peris, who is a fund manager, dissected the whole crazy story without getting too technical. His questions were sharp and it looks like he has some great episodes on politics and history. He’s a Russian politics buff and we had a great chat about that after the podcast ended.

Personal finance specialist Rick Ferri had me on the Bogleheads on Investing podcast. The Bogleheads are acolytes of the late Jack Bogle, a pioneer of passive investing and the founder of Vanguard. Bogle has literally saved Americans, and cost Wall Street, tens of billions of dollars. If you want a methodical explanation of what happened and who’s who in this story then this is your best listen.

The multitalented James Altucher, who used to be both a day trader and hedge fund manager, has a great podcast that I’ve listened to for years on and off. It was a thrill to be a guest. His questions were rapid fire and they kept me on my feet. If you’re not into hearing me drone on too long then this is the one you want.

Veteran financial journalist Roben Farzad had me on Full-Disclosure Radio, which also runs on some NPR stations. He understands this stuff inside and out and it was a very relaxing talk for me – so relaxing that I made a Freudian slip and called GameStop “Blockbuster.” Oops. As an extra bonus, he also interviewed The Mulligan Brothers, the filmmakers behind the upcoming documentary “Apes Together Strong.”

investing · journalism

On CNBC for GameStop Mania Anniversary

I spoke about the book (out in a week!!!!) with CNBC this morning. I’m no natural on TV and always a bit nervous about condensing the insights of a whole column, much less a 320 page book, into a series of soundbites. But I think Andrew Ross Sorkin’s questions were sharp and my answers were acceptably concise. Check it out:

investing · The book

With the Mulligans on Full-D Radio

Full D Radio

I had the pleasure of being interviewed about the upcoming book by veteran financial journalist Roben Farzad on Full Disclosure Radio, which airs on NPR stations and is available as a podcast. This was a double treat because Roben is so well-prepared and also because he also interviewed two young men, Quinn and Finley Mulligan, for the same segment.

I spoke with a lot of smart people for the book, ranging from experts on options trading to social psychology to short selling to problem gambling to marketing to behavioral finance to Silicon Valley’s culture, but people like Quinn and Finley are really the subject of the book and their insight was tremendously valuable. They are among the “apes” who bought and continue to buy GameStop, AMC and other meme stocks either as a way of making money, sending a message, or both. While I don’t personally recommend doing that, their explanation in the podcast of why they and others continue to is smart and worth a listen. And they aren’t just any apes – the twin brothers are in the process of making a documentary about it, Apes Together Strong.

The rise of the apes and the rush of young investors into stock and crypto trading is the biggest personal finance story, if not financial story period, of the past few years. I knew I had to write about it as soon as one of my sons pointed me to what was happening on r/wallstreetbets a year ago. The episode blew multi-billion dollar holes in some of the slickest hedge funds on Wall Street. But it also poured billions more into the coffers of other Wall Street establishments who claim to be “democratizing finance” and continues to do so.

I hope you’ll check out the podcast, the upcoming documentary and, of course, my book.

Columns · investing · The book

Does Your Index Fund Have “Diamond Hands?”

Yes, these are Roaring Kitty’s hands

Anybody who has read my first book knows that I take a mostly dim view of active management. Still, this week I wrote about an episode central to my upcoming book that proves an exception: how active managers handled meme stocks.

When the market values of GameStop, and AMC went up several hundred or thousand percent based on no change in their fundamental value, active fund managers did the obvious thing – they dumped them and moved on. But index funds, which tend to beat those active managers in the long run, held tight with “diamond hands” because they have to. In some cases they bought more at inflated valuations as their assets grew or as those companies issued shares to their now almost entirely retail base of owners. The only passive investor I’m aware of that was able to take the money and run was Dimensional Fund Advisors (I interviewed their deputy head of portfolio management, Mary Phillips, for the column). Even today, with their share prices (in my opinion) still grossly elevated, the main owners of the meme stocks are the self-described “apes,” many of whom believe there is still a short squeeze looming because of phantom shares.

Active fund managers shouldn’t look a gift primate in the mouth. The last year that funds benchmarked to the Morningstar Large Blend category outperformed that benchmark was in 2013 and before that it was 2009, according to a study by Hartford Funds. Index funds have strung together several consecutive winning years over their active counterparts during extended bull markets in the past, too—for example between 1994 and 1999.

This is one of those cases when owning an index fund can be frustrating. As of today, the top two holdings in the Russell 2000 Value Index – let me repeat, “value” – are AMC and Avis Budget Group, another company that recently got the meme treatment for discussing the addition of electric vehicles to its fleet. Whatever.

Columns · investing

Aching Backs = Big Bucks

Sometimes a fairly small company that I know will otherwise fall through the cracks catches my eye. The latest one is “The Joint,” a fast-growing chain of storefront chiropractic clinics. I learned a lot in the process of reporting it, most of it about the business of franchising rather than the iffy science of back “adjustments.”

The chain had been on a rocket ship ride with its stock up by 3,000% since the current CEO took over in April 2016. Then it took a tumble on a short-seller’s report. I don’t think that the report blew the lid off of a flaky company, as some reports do. But it correctly pointed out that the stock was pricing in some unrealistic growth.

Probably the most analogous company, and one most readers will know, is Massage Envy. Its founder was CEO of The Joint for a while and he sold Massage Envy in 2008 when it was still in its growth phase. It has been stalled for the past decade or so.

Will this do better? Back pain is a big problem, but The Joint has lots of imitators like SnapCrack and Chiro Now with similar no-insurance, subscription-based formulas. It has around 1% of the overall U.S. market and is the biggest storefront player so there is plenty of room to grow. Unfortunately, its revenue opportunity isn’t as big as it seems because clinics charge a lot more and offer more services. The Joint’s market value of $1.2 billion already assumes it will snatch a large share of a pretty big pie at more than 100 times projected earnings for 2023 when its management thinks it will reach 1,000 stores.

Some stores’ impressive profits represent in part an owner-operator’s sweat equity. For both the occasionally underemployed practitioners and their patients, a storefront’s simplicity has been appealing compared with high-pressure clinics. If one views the chain as being at the very early stages of disrupting its sector and assumes that its head start will make it the McDonald’s of back pain then its valuation could be a bargain. But if it is more like another Massage Envy then the stock’s price and its future cash flows are seriously misaligned.

“Aching Backs Equal Big Bucks, but an Adjustment Looms” WSJ, October 16, 2021